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Abstract
We consider a game with meta-playerswho observe each others ac-
tions before actual play. This observability exerts an e¤ect similar to
repeated games without discounting. This analysis is novel in that it
makes mimic strategiespossible; meta-players are allowed to take the
same actions as opponents would take. Such mimic strategies have been
excluded from strategy sets as a cause of an indeterminacy problem in-
herent in meta-game settings in the existing literature. We resolve the
problem by introducing beliefsabout actions that opponents are tak-
ing. The game has Nash equilibria with any individually rational payo¤
proles. In addition, the outcomes that satisfy a modied version of
evolutionary stability lead to Pareto e¢ ciency in coordination games.
Keywords: Metagame; Folk theorem; Evolutionarily stable set; Equi-
librium selection
JEL classication: C70
1 Introduction
In the Prisoners Dilemma game, playing confession is the unique
strictly dominant strategy although the outcome (confession, confession)
is not Pareto-e¢ cient. How to solve such dilemma-like situations, one of
which is the trigger strategies in innite repeated games, has been dis-
cussed. In this paper, we present a di¤erent approach to this problem.
The idea behind our argument is of ancient vintage. Gauthier (1986)
suggests that truly rational players can develop dispositions, and that
voluntary cooperation in one-shot interactions could be achieved. Sup-
pose a disposition to take silenceif the opponent has the same dispo-
sition, and take confessionif di¤erent. We call this disposition a con-
strained maximizer. Another disposition is to take confessionalways.
We call it a straightforward maximizer. Such dispositions are observable
before taking actions. Players choose not between actions silenceand
confession,but between the above two dispositions.
There is a Nash equilibrium in this new game with a pair of the con-
strained maximizer dispositions, and induces the Pareto-e¢ cient out-
come. However, this formularization is open to question: Where are
all the other possible dispositions in Gauthiers (1986) game? Other
conditional behaviors on opponents disposition could be possible than
the above two dispositions. For example, one can play silencealways.
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Once we introduce the new disposition, the specication of the above
two dispositions are incomplete. There would be multiple ways to spec-
ify what to do if the opponent has the new disposition, and so on.
Howard (1971) denes metagameas formal game theory. Let us
consider 1-metagame rst. 1-means player 1s conditional strategy.
Player 1 does not play simple action confessionor silence,but in-
stead chooses a mapping from player 2s actions to self actions. Player
1s possible strategies are playing confessionalways, playing silence
always, playing the same action as player 2, and playing the opposite to
player 2.
We can make the problem even more complicated. Let us assume that
player 2 can make a choice based on player 1s choice in 1-metagame,
here referred to as 21-metagame. Then player 2s strategies are mappings
from four player 1s strategies to the set of player 2s actions (confes-
sionand silence).
In this 21-metagame, there are three pure strategy Nash equilibria,
two of which correspond to a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome (silence, silence),
and one of which corresponds to a Pareto-dominated outcome (confes-
sion, confession). Howard (1971) concludes that the Pareto-e¢ cient out-
come stands to reason since no one prefers Pareto-dominated outcomes.
There are, however, serious doubts. At rst, Howard (1971) regards
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it as trivial to narrow down the candidates of a solution to Pareto-
e¢ cient ones. This is not necessarily the case on equilibrium selection,
for example, in coordination games.
More seriously, we may get into questions about how multilayer the
playersinferences are. Is it su¢ cient to suppose the 21layer? Or, is
there any metagame with symmetric strategies?
Unfortunately, we cannot construct a game in which players observe
each others strategy before playing games, from a strictly logical per-
spective. (See, for example, Wärneryd (2010)).
There are two approaches to avoid this problem. First, Kalai et
al (2010) restrict strategies to play, and prove a folk-theorem-like result.
However, the above problem in Gauthier (1986) occurs once again. That
is, we cannot justify a strategy set that excludes some strategies. Kalai et
al (2010) write in their example of price competition This formulation
disallows vague ads, like I will undercut opponentsprices by $50,which
fail to specify a response price to an identical competitors ad. This
restriction of the strategy set might be too restrictive. Although there
is no consistent action pair in the case that both players will undercut
each other, consistent outcomes exist when one will undercut the other
and when the other will overcut (setting aside whether the player is
willing to overcut). When we interpret the whole game as a delegation
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agreement, the undercut strategy seems natural. It may distort the game
to suppose that players can never adopt the undercut strategies. To the
authors best knowledge, this paper is the rst study that provides a
model with undercut strategies without causing the indeterminacy
problem.
The second approach is to observe not strategies themselves but a
coarse partition of each others strategy set as in Wärneryd (2010). For
example, we can consider a game in which before playing a Prisoners
Dilemma game, the players observe to which classbetween the follow-
ing two below the opponents strategy belongs:
class 1 Silence when the opponents strategy belongs to class 1 and con-
fession when the opponents strategy belongs to class 2.
class 2 All the other strategies.
Certainly, other classications can be created by changing the parti-
tion of the strategy set.
Wärneryd (2010) shows that for any underlying 2-player, nite, normal-
form game there is a game extended with such coarsely observable strate-
gies that has equilibria with payo¤s arbitrarily close to any feasible, in-
dividually rational payo¤ prole. However, there is no discussion as to
whether the classications are reasonable. In this example, when a player
observes class 1, she comes to know the opponents strategy before the
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actual play. Otherwise, she cannot know for certain which strategy the
opponent would play, since the strategy belongs to class 2 with multiple
strategies. The classication discriminates against actions or strategies.
We will construct a setting of observable actions. It is well dened
that the players observe one anothers actions (which the opponents are
actually playing). In our setting, the undercut strategiesare (poten-
tially) possible for players, and there is no distinction among strategies.
Since observability of actions allows players to send signals to one an-
other, it is natural to compare our model and pre-play communication
games. In communication equilibria all players send costless signals to
one another, whereas in our model, players can send only commitment
signals. Although pre-play communication extension in games with mul-
tiple equilibria has been successful in leading to Pareto e¢ ciency via a
secret handshaketo some extent (e.g., Wärneryd (1991)), there is still
an ine¢ cient equilibrium that is evolutionarily stable. Our model re-
places cheap talk with observability, and resolves the problem. That is,
only Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes are selected among multiple equilibria.
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2 Model
2.1 Underlying Game
We consider a two-person normal form gameG =< N = f1; 2g ; (A1; A2) ; (u1; u2) >.
N is a set of players. Ai is an action set for player i 2 N . Assume jAij  2
for all i. We dene a set A = (A1; A2) of action proles. ui : A! R is a
utility function for player i. We use the standard convention where for
every player i, player  i denotes the other player.
Example 1 Consider a 2 2 prisonersdilemma:
Player 2
c d
Player 1 c 2; 2 0; 3
d 3; 0 1; 1
The action set for each player is fc; dg.
2.2 Meta Game
Now we introduce meta strategies, assuming that each player observes
the opponents action, and takes various actions depending on the op-
ponents actions. There may be multiple action proles realized when a
meta strategy simply means an action plan; that is, the mapping from
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an opponents action set to her action set. In a symmetric game, for
example, the mimic plan, I would take the same action as the oppo-
nent would takeis such a mapping. When both players employ mimic
plans, all symmetric action proles can be realized. We need a kind of
beliefs(see below) to determine the actual opponents action.
Example 2 We consider the same 22 prisonersdilemma as mentioned
above. A strategy can be represented as a string xy, where x (resp. y)
is the action chosen when the opponents action is c (d). We identify a
players belief about the opponents action with the capital letter, which
has to be the action she plays actually. For example, strategy Cd means
to take action c if the opponents action is c, to take d if the opponents
action is d, and to have a belief that the opponent would take c (because
the rst letter of the string is capitalized).
Formally, we dene a meta game G? =< N; = (1;2) ; (f1; f2) >.
i = (si; bi) 2 i = (Si; Bi) is a strategy for player i, where  =
(1; 2) 2 (1;2) = . si : A i ! Ai is an action plan for player
i, where s = (s1; s2) 2 (S1; S2) = S. bi 2 Bi = A i is a belief for player
i, where b = (b1; b2) 2 (B1; B2) = B.
Example 3 Strategy prole (Cd;Cd) is well dened in the sense that
the belief of each player is consistent with the opponents action, which
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we call a feasible strategy prole. The realized payo¤ prole is (2; 2).
Contrarily, (Cd;Dc) is not feasible. There is no belief prole that would
allow this mapping pair to be feasible.
Denition 1 Strategy prole  is feasible in G? if s i (b i) = bi for all
i.
In the case that  is feasible, fi () = ui (si (bi) ; bi) holds for all
i 2 N .
Searching for feasible strategy proles in meta games and for Nash
equilibria in underlying games have much in common. When we in-
terpret a Nash equilibrium in an underlying game, we usually suppose
that players have conjectures about othersactions. Players choose ac-
tions as best responses to their conjectures. When the play begins, the
conjectures are consistent with the realized action prole.
Denition 2 0i = (s
0
i; b
0
i) is a feasible deviation from feasible strategy
prole  = (s; b) if there exists a (unique) belief b00 i 2 B i such that
ex-post strategy prole j0i =
 
(s0i; s i) ;
 
b0i; b
00
 i
 2  is feasible.
The description of deviations in our meta game is akin to the one in
repeated games. Action plan s0i and action prole (s
0
i (b
0
i) ; b
0
i) correspond
to a strategy and action prole ow, respectively, on the equilibrium
path in repeated games. When a player deviates and changes her strat-
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egy, the action proles on the equilibrium path may change despite the
opponents strategy remaining unchanged. Thus, even a unilateral
deviation can cause a change in the opponents realized action.
Denition 3 Strategy prole  is a Nash equilibrium if for any i and
feasible deviation 0i,
fi (j0i)  fi ()
holds.
Example 4 Player 1 has four feasible deviations from strategy prole
(Cd;Cd). Here is a list of the ex-post strategy proles corresponding to
all player 1s feasible deviations, and the payo¤ proles:
(Cd;Cd) (itself!) (2; 2)
(Cc;Cd) (2; 2)
(cD; cD) (1; 1)
(dD; cD) (1; 1)
The same holds for player 2. Therefore, (Cd;Cd) is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider meta strategy (si; bi) in which si (b0i) = ai for all b
0
i as a
meta extension of action ai in the underlying game.
Lemma 1 A strategy prole in which all strategies are meta extensions
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of actions consisting of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in underlying
game G is a Nash equilibrium in meta game G?.
Using a (payo¤) matrix of an nm underlying game may be easier
to understand. Suppose that player 2 plays meta strategy (s2; a11) as an
extension of action a12, and that player 1 plays (s1; a
1
2) in which s1 (a
1
2) =
a11. The action prole realized is (a
1
1; a
1
2), which corresponds to mark ~
in the payo¤matrix below. The beliefs in feasible deviations by player 1
have to be a12. In the matrix, the action proles realized by the feasible
deviations by player 1 line up on the rst column, which corresponds to
mark  (or ~).
Player 2
a12 a
2
2    am2
a11 ~     
Player 1 a21      
...
...
...
. . .
...
an1      
In contrast, if player 2 plays meta strategy (s02; a
1
1) in which s
0
2 (a
1
1) =
a12, s
0
2 (a
2
1) = a
m
2 , : : :, and s
0
2 (a
n
1 ) = a
2
2, the corresponding action proles
10
realized by the feasible deviations by player 1 are as follows:
Player 2
a12 a
2
2    am2
a11 ~     
Player 1 a21      
...
...
...
. . .
...
an1      
When we consider feasible deviations in a meta game, we must focus not
only to the column in the matrix in the underlying game, but also to all
cells of the matrix.
3 Folk Theorem
We can now characterize the equilibria of meta games. Dene
ui = max
ai2Ai
min
a i2A i
ui (ai; a i) ;
as the maximin payo¤ of player i in underlying game G.
Proposition 1 Let a 2 A be an action prole of underlying game G.
If and only if we have ui (a)  ui for all i, there is a Nash equilibrium of
meta game G? that induces a.
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Proof. Su¢ ciency: Dene
a^ i (a0i) = arg min
x i2A i
ui (a
0
i; x i) :
Consider  = (s; b) such that si (a i) = ai, that s i (a0i) 2 a^ i (a0i) for all
a0i 6= ai, and that bi = a i for all i. Since we have fi () = ui (a)  ui 
ui (a^ i (a0i)) = fi (j0i) for all feasible deviations 0i = (s0i; b0i) such that
s0i (a i) = a
0
i 6= ai,  is a Nash equilibrium that induces a.
Necessity: Suppose a such that ui < ui for some i. Let  = (s; b)
such that sj (bj) = aj for all j. There exists feasible deviation 0i =
(s0i; b
0
i) 6= i such that
s0i (b
0
i) 2 arg max
a0i2Ai
u (a0i; s i (a
0
i)) ;
so that 0i is a strictly better reply to  i than i. Hence  cannot be
an equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium Selection
In this section we focus on a nite and symmetric two-person game with
a unique Pareto dominant payo¤ prole. We extend the concept of an
evolutionarily stable set to our meta game. The basic idea follows:
There are many agents who play identical strategies in a meta game.
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If a small number of agents mutate and play other (identical) strategies,
incumbents are not defeated. If there is a strategy by which mutants
keep the same performance as the incumbents, it is included in the evo-
lutionarily stable set.
Dening evolutionary stability in our meta game causes a delicate
problem relating to beliefs. Thus, we dene stability not by single-
population but by two-population.
Denition 4 A set X of strategy proles is an evolutionarily stable set
if for all  2 X, for all i; j = 1; 2 (i 6= j), for all feasible deviations  i
from , and for all feasible deviations  j from j i such that the action
plan of  j is the same as that of  i,
1. fi (j i) < fi () or
2. fi (j i) = fi () and fj (j ij j) < fj (j i) or
3. fi (j i) = fi () and fj (j ij j) = fj (j i) and j ij j 2 X.
It is straightforward to check that two evolutionarily stable sets co-
incide or are disjoint using the same type of reasoning as with the usual
concept of evolutionarily stable sets.
The Pareto-e¢ cient outcome in such a meta game is clearly that both
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players receive a Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤  in the underlying game. Let
X# = f 2  : f1 () = f2 () = g :
We denote c 2 A1 = A2 as an action that induces . In general, this set
is not a singleton.
Example 5 We consider a 2 2 symmetric coordination game:
Player 2
c d
Player 1 c 2; 2 0; 0
d 0; 0 1; 1
Nash equilibrium (dD; dD) is not in the evolutionarily stable set of this
meta game. Suppose that it is evolutionarily stable. Then there are
feasible deviations  1 =  2 = cD, and (cD; cD) must be in the evolu-
tionarily stable set. However, this is not a Nash equilibrium since Cd is
a feasible deviation for both players and strictly improves the payo¤s,
which leads to a contradiction.
Proposition 2 X# is the unique evolutionarily stable set in G?.
Proof. We prove rst that X# is an evolutionarily stable set. Suppose
that  2 X#, and let  i and  j be feasible deviations from  and j i
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respectively. We proceed to show that one of the conditions 1.-3. in
the above denition is met.  is a Nash equilibrium since players could
not obtain higher payo¤s than : fi (j i)  fi (). If the inequality is
strict, condition 1. is met. In the case of equality, we have fi (j i) =
fi () = . However, since  is the Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤,  i must take
only an action that makes j react with c, and  i must always reply to
the opponents action from  by taking c. Hence, fj (j i) = , and
thus fj (j ij j)  fj (j i) by Pareto dominance. If the inequality is
strict, condition 2. is met. If equality holds, then fj (j ij j) = , which
implies, as before, that  j reacts with c to j i. Hence, j ij j 2 X#,
and thus condition 3. is met.
Next, we prove thatX# is the only evolutionarily stable set. Suppose
that X is evolutionarily stable and that, contrary to the claim, there
exists strategy prole  2 X such that fi () <  (i = 1; 2). We proceed
in three steps to show that this leads to a contradiction. First, we
construct strategy  i that behaves like i against strategies in X, and is
niceto the opponent. Second, we show that there exists  j (j 6= i) such
that j ij j 2 X. Third, we show that j ij j is not a Nash equilibrium.
Step 1: For strategy j = (sj; bj), let  i be the associated modied
strategy (ti; bi), where the player is belief is the same as that of
i, where ti (bi) = si (bi), and where ti (aj) = c for all aj 6= bi. In
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other words,  i takes the same action with the same belief as i
does. Their payo¤s are the same:
fi (j i) = fj (j i) = fi ()
Step 2: When we dene  j =  i, fj (j ij j) = fj (j i) holds. By
condition 3. in the denition of evolutionary stability, j ij j 2 X.
Step 3: j ij j is not a Nash equilibrium, since the strategy  0i = (ti; c)
by player i is a strictly better response to j ij j.
5 Concluding Comments
We have seen how the naive notion of transparency and reciprocal co-
operation can be rescued, and how it is related to equilibrium selection.
The logic in our model is reminiscent of a green beard.The idea
of a green-beard gene was proposed by Hamilton (1964) and named as
Green Beardby Dawkins (1976). The concept remained a theoretical
possibility until 1998, when a green beard gene was rst found in nature,
in the red re ant (Solenopsis invicta). There is much literature in
which meta-playersare considered to be delegated people. One might
consider that our model ts with a biological interpretation that genes
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delegate individuals.
A setting such as innitely repeated games justies a number of indi-
vidually rational outcomes, and tends to be out of place at equilibrium
selection. However, by using the secret handshake argument in pre-play
communication games, evolutionary stability selects only Pareto-e¢ cient
outcomes in our model.
Appendix
A.1 Example of Nonexistence of Nash Equilibrium
As will be appreciated from the folk theorem, our meta game often has
many Nash equilibria. However the existence of a Nash equilibrium is
not necessarily the case. For example, consider the following underlying
game with no individually rational payo¤ prole:
Player 2
c d
Player 1 c 1 + "; "  "; 1 + "
d "; 1  " 1  "; "
where " > 0 is su¢ ciently small. This underlying game is obtained by a
perturbation of matching pennies. For any action prole, either players
payo¤ is lower than her maximin payo¤.
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A.2 Mixed Extension
It is possible to extend the strategy sets in a meta game by permitting
mixed strategies, symbolized by indices . si 2 Si is a probability
distribution on Si, and bi 2 Bi is a probability distribution on Bi. We
further dene i = (s

i ; b

i ) etc.
Denition 5 Mixed strategy prole  = (s; ) is feasible if for all s
and b in the supports of s and b, respectively, (s; b) is feasible, and
Pr fbi in bi g =
X
(s;b)2:s i(b i)=bi
Pr

s i in s i
	
Pr

b i in b i
	
;
for all i.
Lemma 2 In mixed Nash equilibrium  = (s; b),
f i (
) = fi ((s; b)) ;
for all s and b in the supports of s and b, respectively.
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Example 6 We consider a 2 2 game:
Player 2
c d
Player 1 c 1; 1 0; 0
d 0; 0 1; 1
There is a mixed Nash equilibrium in which both players play cdj (pc+ (1  p) d)
that means playing c if the opponents action is c, playing d if the oppo-
nents action is d, and believing that the opponent would take action c
with probability p and d with 1 p. The outcome is (c; c) with probability
p and (d; d) with 1  p.
A.3 More than Two-Person
We can easily extend the meta game to cases of three or more players.
However the necessity part of the folk theorem does not hold. We present
a counter example below.
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Example 7 We consider a three-player game:
Player 3
c d
Player 2 Player 2
c d c d
Player 1 c 3; 3; 0 1; 4; 0 Player 1 c 2; 2; 1 0; 3; 1
d 4; 1; 0 2; 2; 0 d 3; 0; 1 1; 1; 1
The payo¤ structure for players 1 and 2 is similar to the above prisoners
dilemma game. In the underlying game, the unique dominant strategy
equilibrium is (d; d; d), and their maximin payo¤s are 1. In the meta
game, however, there is a Nash equilibrium (s; b) that induces the worst
payo¤ for player 3, which is strictly less than her maximin payo¤ in the
underlying game.
s1 (c; c)= s1 (c; d) = c;
s1 (d; c)= s1 (d; d) = d;
s2 (c; c)= s2 (d; d) = c;
s2 (c; d)= s2 (d; c) = d;
s3 (; )= c, and
bi=(c; c) for all i,
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where actions in parenthesis are arranged in ascending order of the play-
ersnames other than selves. As long as player 3 takes action c, the
strategies of players 1 and 2 are the same as (Cd;Cd) in 2  2 games,
and neither want to deviate from this situation. Although player 3 seems
to have an incentive to take action d so as to obtain her maximin payo¤
1 strictly better than present payo¤ 0, there is no feasible deviation for
player 3 to take action d.
One may wonder why player 3 cannot play as she wishes. The author
agrees that the collusion by players 1 and 2 not to let player 3 play d
causes a feeling of strangeness. There exist other plausible equilibria, in
one of which, for example, all play a meta extension of action d. Al-
though we may feel ourselves compelled to exclude such Nash equilibria
as impractical, doing so has a more serious e¤ect. Consider the game
below:
Player 3
c d
Player 2 Player 2
c d c d
Player 1 c 1; 1; 0 0; 0; 0 Player 1 c 1; 0; 1 0; 1; 1
d 0; 0; 0 1; 1; 0 d 0; 1; 1 1; 0; 1
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In this (underlying) game, player 1 is willing to play the same actions
as player 2 plays. While player 2 is willing to play the same actions as
player 1 plays if player 3 plays action c, she is willing to play di¤erent
actions from player 1s actions if player 3 plays d. When we consider the
meta game, the same strategy prole as above is a Nash equilibrium,
which appropriately seems to reect the incentives of players 1 and 2.
Therefore, it would be overkill to exclude this strategy prole from the
equilibrium concept. By comparison, there is no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the underlying game.
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